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Abstract
This paper is intended to make a contribution to the empirical literature explaining the rise of
unemployment since the 1970s in western economies by means of interactions between
shocks and institutions. The contribution is twofold. First, the impact of a general feature of
developed economies that has been surprisingly neglected in the literature is analyzed,
namely, the employment shift from industry and agriculture to services. The second
contribution of the paper is the focus on the interaction of that shock with the administrative
burdens on firm creation. The working hypotheses is that countries that impose high costs on
the creation of new companies are not able to create enough jobs in the service sector to
successfully absorb the workers released from the agriculture and industry sector. The result
is higher unemployment.
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Robert Solow once said that one of the few good ways to test analytical ideas is
to see whether they can make sense of international diﬀerences in institutional
structure and historical development. This paper follows that advise, as do most
of the large literature aimed at explaining the unusual and persistent increase
in the unemployment rate from the 1970s in virtually all western capitalist
economies.
In the 1970s the discussion was dominated by a shock story. Supply shocks
of the 1970s and 1980s and the contractional macroeconomic policies to ﬁght
inﬂation were blamed for unemployment. But shocks across countries are not
likely to vary enough to explain the observed diﬀerences in labour market per-
formance. And the eﬀect of shocks on unemployment is in any case temporary.
Then how can one explain the persistence on the one hand and the diﬀerent
unemployment experiences across countries on the other?
The focus moved to labour market institutions, ignoring shocks all together
sometimes. But the ”usual suspects”, the unemployment insurance system, the
employment protection legislation or the union power were already in place when
European unemployment was below the North-American one. There are three
possible answers to that. First, labour market rigidities have become worse over
time. It is true that some institutions, as the beneﬁt insurance system or the
tax wedge, have grown consistently in most OECD countries.1 But others such
as employment protection legislation or union density have decreased in the last
decade (after an initial period of increase). The second way out could be that
labour market rigidities impact on labour performance with a lag. The rise of
unemployment in the early 70s could be then the result of rigidities introduced
in the market ten years before.
The third answer, however, is lately the most popular: labour market rigidi-
ties were not so important in the past because there were no adverse shocks.
Diﬀerences in labour market outcomes must be due to diﬀerences in the way
that countries respond to similar shocks, which depends ultimately on the coun-
try speciﬁc institutions. It is the interaction of shocks with institutions what
1By ”increase” or ”growth” of institutions it is meant a change that makes labour markets
more ”rigid” as could be an extension of the time unemployed receive beneﬁts or an increase
in the tax wedge. The opposite holds with ”decrease”.
2can explain the persistence of the shocks and the diﬀerent labour market perfor-
mance evolution across economies, after being hit by similar shocks. The ﬁrst
economists in picking this idea up were Michael Bruno and Jeﬀrey Sacks in their
1985 book The Economics of Worldwide Stagﬂation where they focused on the
interaction of the 1970s oil price shocks with the nature of collective bargaining.
This paper is intended to make a contribution to this line of research. The
contribution is twofold. First, the impact of a general feature of developed
economies that has been surprisingly neglected in the literature is analyzed,
namely, the employment shift from industry and agriculture to services. The
second contribution of the paper is the focus on the interaction of that shock
with the administrative burdens on ﬁrm creation, start-up costs from now on.
The working hypotheses is that countries which impose high costs on the
creation of new companies are not able to create enough jobs in the service sector
to successfully absorb the workers released from the agriculture and industry
sector. The result is higher unemployment.
The employment shift towards the service sector is a very well documented
fact. Viktor Fuchs published in 1968 his path-breaking study The Service Econ-
omy. Around that time, Baumol published in the American Economic Review
his paper ”Unbalanced Growth,” where the possible causes of the wide-spread
shift of labour from industry and agriculture to the service sector were laid out.2
Baumol sorted economic activities into two groups: technologically progres-
sive activities in which innovations, capital accumulation and economies of scale
lead to increases in labour productivity (production sector); and constant pro-
ductivity activities where labour is not a mean but the end so innovation can
hardly increase productivity (service sector). The increase in labour productiv-
ity in the former sector brings in an increase in wages that is then spread to
the overall economy. The constant productivity sector cannot compensate the
rise in wages so production costs and prices increase. There are several eﬀects
at stake. First, the labour productivity growth is generating wealth that will
be spent in services and non-services. Second, the relative increase in the ser-
vice prices is inducing people to substitute away from services. As long as the
substitution eﬀect is not ”too large” (the service demand is price-inelastic), the
2See also [2] where a third sector of ”asymptocally stagnation”, with a mix of progressive
and stagnant inputs, was introduced. In [11] Baumol’s unbalanced growth and Kaldor’s
balcanced growth are reconcile.
3overall demand for services will not decrease. To keep production in a sector
with constant or decreasing productivity, labour has to be shifted from the high
productivity sector.
Figure 1 shows the unweighted OECD average of manufacturing to service
labour productivity and manufacturing to service price deﬂator. The pattern
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Figure 1: Manufacturing to service labour productivity and price index. Average
OECD
Following Baumol we claim that the employment shift into services was the
outcome of an exogenous shock: the slower productivity growth in services
relative to non-service sectors. This approach is consistent with the arguments
linking total factor productivity growth slowdown with unemployment but it
emphasizes the diﬀerential productivity growth in services and the rest of the
economy.3 Rather than on the overall fall in the supply or demand of jobs, the
focus is on the shift of jobs and workers from non-service to service activities.
Figure 2 shows the annualized growth from 1970 to 1997 of total employment
3See [26] and more recently [7]. The argument is that the slowdown in total productivity
growth has not been matched with a slowdown of wages and therefore unemployment has
increased.
4compared to the annualized growth of working age population in seven OECD






















































































































































































































































































































































































￿ WAP 1.17 2.47 0.66 1.15 1.54 0.45 2.11 1.23






￿ Empl. corrected by WAP -0.71 -0.52 -0.42 0.45 -1.29 0.05 1.48 -0.34
FR GER IT JP SP UK USA EU
Figure 2: Employment and working age population annualized groth, in %.
1970-97
Only Japan, the UK and the USA were able to create enough jobs to com-
pensate for the increase in working age population. Spain had an unfortunate
combination of very poor employment growth and rather high increase in work-
ing age population. The question is, what is behind those diﬀerences in em-
ployment growth? Figure 3 shows the annualized contribution of each economic
sector to total employment growth. The sector contributions are calculated as
the annualized sector employment growth weighted by the sector’s initial share
of total employment.
Service employment growth accounts for most of total employment growth.
The poor employment performance of Spain is the result of a very large re-







































































































































































































































































































































































































Services 1.58 2.19 1.30 1.80 1.50 1.42 3.32 1.69
Total employment 0.46 1.95 0.24 1.60 0.25 0.50 3.59 0.88
FR GER IT JP SP UK USA EU
Figure 3: Annualized sector contribution to employment growth, in %. 1970-97
sector, along with a below average service job creation. The impressive perfor-
mance of the USA is due to an incredible ability to create jobs in the service
sector and of a very limited (none) loss of employment in the non-service sec-
tors. Marimon and Zilibotti [1998] calculated that almost 80% of the long-run
employment diﬀerential growth across countries and industries is accounted by
sector eﬀects (diﬀerent initial distribution of labour across industries) and only
20% by country eﬀects.
The inability of the major European economies to create enough jobs to
absorb the increasing supply of labour has been well documented. Krueger and
Pischke [1997], for example, decompose the growth of employment between pop-
ulation growth and other reasons and show that population growth in Europe
does not create jobs at the same rate as it does in USA. They go further in the
paper and claim that the reason for this is not, as usually believed, Europe’s
wage rigidity. That explanation would imply that unemployment would have to
6increase most in Europe among groups whose wages have fallen most in USA.
But that is not the case: the unemployment rate of the low-skilled group of
workers (relative to the high-skilled one) is roughly the same in Europe and
the United States. Krueger and Pischke rather suggest that the problem is the
existence of restrictions on bringing new products to the market or on starting
new businesses. When these restrictions are in place, the increase in labour
supply is not traduced in an equivalent increase in the number of employers,
and unemployment results.
This brings us to the second contribution of this paper, which is to relate the
inability to create ”enough” service jobs in some countries to their institutions
governing ﬁrm creation and other product market regulations.
The 1994 McKinsey Global Institute report ”Employment Performance” was
perhaps the ﬁrst study which claimed that product market regulations, as op-
posed to labour market regulations, were very important in explaining poor job
creation in the service sector in Europe. Also in 1994, the OECD Jobs Study
aﬃrmed that ”new jobs are likely to appear in the service sector, which already
accounts for more than half of total employment in most OECD countries(..).
New jobs must certainly be generated by the private sector, because in nearly
all countries budget deﬁcits and resistance to tax increases rule out signiﬁcant
expansion of the public sector (...). Eﬀorts to improve the capacity of economies
to create jobs should focus on facilitating the development and use of technol-
ogy; working time ﬂexibility; encouragement of entrepreneurship and a general
review of policies that may be hampering job creation.”4
The OECD went further in this direction publishing in 1998 a monograph
titled ”Fostering Entrepreneurship.” They also have very recently published
comparable data on product market regulations (details are given in the next
section) and consistent data on ﬁrm dynamics for 10 OECD countries. The
paper by Scarpetta et al. [2002] is an extremely recent application of both
data-sets. In that paper the authors test the role that policy and institutional
settings in product and labour markets play for productivity and ﬁrm dynam-
ics. They ﬁnd that industry productivity performance is negatively aﬀected
by strict product market regulations. The second important ﬁnding is that
more cumbersome regulation on entrepreneurial activity and costs of adjusting
4[21]. See the electronic version at http://www1.oecd.org/sge/min/job94/tabcont.htm
7the workforce seem to negatively aﬀect the entry of new small ﬁrms and their
posterior expansion.
The current paper claims that countries which suﬀered the biggest rise in
unemployment are the ones that failed to provide policies and institutions that
were conductive to the employment in services. A key policy in this respect
is the regulation of business openings. Service employment occurs on average
in smaller and more decentralized establishments than manufacturing and suc-
cessful new job creation in services requires the setting up of new companies.5
Countries where starting a business is cumbersome have failed to accommodate
the employment shift from manufacturing and agriculture into services, at the
cost of higher unemployment.
The paper follows very closely the methodology used by Blanchard and
Wolfers in their highly acknowledge paper of 2000 (that paper will be referred
as B&W from now on). In that paper the authors use a panel of 20 countries
to explain the evolution of unemployment in the OECD from the 1960s via the
interaction of shocks and institutions. The shocks included are the decrease in
annual TFP growth, the increase in long-term interest rate, and the shift in
labour demand. The institutions include the unemployment insurance system,
the cost of hiring and ﬁring, wage bargaining characteristics and active labour
market policies.
Taking as a starting point the B&W model, we substitute the aggregate TFP
growth by the diﬀerential productivity growth in manufacturing and services,
and add one institution, namely, start-up costs. The purpose is to test whether
start-up costs, when interacted with the shift of employment from non-services
to services, can explain the poor service employment performance and high
unemployment rate of some countries.
The next section describes with some detail the data used in the estimations.
Section three explains the methodology and empirical results. Section four
concludes.
5In 1995 the average service ﬁrm size in the Eurpean Union was of 5 employees, as compared
to 16 employees in industry and energy. The data for United States is in 1997 of 21 and 56
employees respectively. As Scarpetta et al. conﬁrm in their paper, American entrant ﬁrms
are smaller than European ones but then expand much more.
82D a t a d e s c r i p t i o n
A cross-country time-series data-set building on the one constructed and an-
alyzed by B&W has been put together.6 We drew data from B&W for un-
employment, labour market institutions and shocks. Time-varying institutions
from Nickell and Nunziata [2002] (N&N for future reference) and Product Mar-
ket Indicators from the OECD were added. The three macroeconomic shocks of
B&W were complemented with a fourth shock intended to capture the sectorial
shift from non-service to service activities over the last decades. A complete
data-set is available for 20 OECD countries along 28 years, from 1970 to 1997.7
The countries included in the analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
and United States.
A detailed description of the shocks and labour market institutions is given
by B&W, Nickell [1997] and N&N. Rather than repeating the technical details
given in the original sources of data, this section is intended to give a general
overview of the data used in the analysis.
There are three dependent variables: unemployment rate, and service and
manufacturing employment ratios. All data come from the OECD annual
Labour Force Survey. Unemployment numbers are those gathered in the Na-
tional Labour Force surveys. Service employment comprises civilian employ-
ment employed in sectors such as wholesale and retail trade; restaurants and
hotels; transport, storage and communications; ﬁnancing, insurance, real state
and business services; and community, social and personal services. We have
also carried out the regressions using industry civilian employment instead of
manufacturing employment; the results are very robust.
Table 1, 2 and 3 show respectively the evolution from 1970 to 1997 of unem-
ployment, service and manufacturing employment in the United States, Japan
and ﬁve large European countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK. Each
column shows the average over the period.
6Both the data-set and the original Stata program are available in Olivier Blanchard’s or
Justin Wolfer’s web-page
7Blanchard and Wolfers [2000] work with a data-set that covers the period 1960-1997.
However, the unavailability of data on sector employment, production and price indexes in
earlier years made it advisable to reduce the observation period to 1970-1997.
9Countries 1970-74 1995-97 Change: 1970-97
France 2.71 11.54 7.37
Germany 1.06 9.85 8.79
Italy 4.27 12.04 7.77
Spain 2.97 22.96 19.99
UK 2.53 7.88 5.35
USA 5.41 5.50 .09
Japan 1.30 3.24 1.94
Source: OECD Annual Labour Force
In % of labor force
Table 1: Unemployment rate
Countries 1970-74 1995-97 Change: 1970-97
France 31.16 39.89 8.73
Germany 29.80 36.68 8.88
Italy 22.42 31.04 8.62
Spain 22.18 28.41 6.23
UK 37.57 48.75 11.19
USA 39.11 53.56 14.45
Japan 34.24 45.64 11.40
Source: OECD Annual Labour Force
In % of working age population
Table 2: Service employment
10Countries 1970-74 1995-97 Change: 1970-97
France 17.91 - -
Germany 32.21 16.34 -15.87
Italy 21.34 11.61 -9.73
Spain 15.40 8.83 -6.57
UK 23.16 13.10 -10.07
USA 15.54 11.86 -3.68
Japan 19.09 16.61 -2.48
Source: OECD Annual Labour Force
In % of working age population
Table 3: Manufacturing employment
Table 1 shows that unemployment varies widely across countries and over
time. Cross country diﬀerences seem to have increased over time. During the
period of 1970-1974, the range went from 1% of unemployment in Germany to
more than 5% in the United States. In the last period of reference diﬀerences
were much larger. Unemployment was low in the range of 4 to 5% of the labour
force in USA and Japan and alarmingly high in Spain where almost a quarter
of the labour force declared itself unemployed.
Looking at the ﬁgures of service employment evolution over the years, it
seems that those countries that experienced the most limited increases in service
employment over the period 1970-97, like Spain or Italy, are also the ones that
suﬀered the largest increases in unemployment in the same period. Indeed, the
correlation between both growth rates (using all countries in the panel) is of
(-0.7). That correlation encourages further research to understand why service
employment did not increase as much in some countries and to what extent that
helps us to understand the diﬀerent unemployment experiences across OECD
countries.
Lastly, Table 3 shows that manufacturing employment has decreased in all
countries in the sample. Specially large are the decreases in Germany and the
UK, with over 10% manufacturing employment less at the end of the period as
compared to the beginning. Other countries like USA and Japan experienced
limited loses of manufacturing employment.
112.1 Labour market institutions
2.1.1 Time-constant institutions
Data for labour market institutions come originally from Nickell [1997]. Nickell
presents averages of eight labour market institutions for 1983-1988 and for 1989-
1994. B&W use the average of both periods as the time-constant value of
each labour market institution. We discuss brieﬂy the deﬁnitions and how the
institutions might interfere with the workings of the labour market.
• Employment Protection Legislation (EPL): The source of the index is the
OECD Jobs Studies published in 1994. The OECD ranked countries ac-
cording to the legal framework governing ﬁring and hiring. The index is
the ranking of 20 countries, 20 indicating the most strictly regulated coun-
try. The OECD measure comprises characteristics both of the individual
and collective contract termination. That includes features as notice time
and ﬁnancial compensation, rights to appeal against termination or ad-
ministrative procedures.
The impact of EPL on unemployment is not clear-cut. On the one hand,
it reduces the inﬂows into unemployment but, on the other, it smooths hiring
in good times, i.e. it reduces the outﬂows from the unemployment pool, hence
increasing unemployment duration.
• Beneﬁt Replacement Rate: Gross beneﬁts for a single person under 50,
expressed as percentage of the most relevant wage (normally gross wage).
• Beneﬁt Duration: It captures how long the unemployed are entitled to
receive unemployment insurance. It is expressed in years. Four or more
years are considered inﬁnite duration. Both measures of the unemploy-
ment insurance system, i.e. replacement rate and duration, come from the
US Department of Health and Social Services: ”Social Security Programs
throughout the World.”
The eﬀect of the unemployment insurance system is more clear-cut. Gener-
ous unemployment beneﬁts increase the reservation wage allowing unemployed
to be more ”choosy.” They also make unemployment less painful and therefore
increase the bargaining power of employees, and decrease the search intensity
of the unemployed.
12• Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP): It refers to expenditures on ac-
tivities for the unemployed that are aimed at helping them back into work.
The numbers are expenditure per unemployed person taken as percentage
of GDP per member of the labour force.
ALMP serve to counteract generous beneﬁt system by making unemployed
more employable and, therefore, reducing the duration of unemployment.
• Union Density: It shows the proportion of trade union members as per-
centage of total wage and salary earners. This variable alone does not give
a good idea of the union inﬂuence in a country, though, since in many
countries wage negotiations aﬀect workers who are not union members.
That is why we need to include as well the next variable.
• Union Coverage: This variable shows the share of workers actually aﬀected
by union bargaining. It takes three values. 1 means that only under 25%
of workers is covered. 2 means that the percentage of covered employees
is between 25 and 70%. Lastly, 3 means that more than 70% of workers
are eﬀected by union negotiation on wages.
• Wage Bargaining Coordination: In each country the degree of employer
and worker wage bargaining coordination is ranked from a low coordina-
tion index of 1 to a high coordination value of 3.
Wage bargaining coordination could eliminate the leapfrogging of uncoordi-
nated union systems. Leapfrogging refers to a situation in which a union tends
to take an earlier pay settlement in a related sector as a baseline to be exceeded
in its own negotiations. That generates an additional source of inﬂationary pres-
sure. Note that coordination is not the same as centralization which normally
means government involvement in wage negotiations. Japan and Germany, for
example, have highly coordinated wage negotiations but neither is centralized.
• Tax burden on labour: This is a crude measure of the tax wedge between
real labour costs and take home pay. It is the sum of the average payroll,
consumption and income tax rates.
The impact of this variable on unemployment should be small. What matters
is how taxes aﬀect the ratio of after-tax unemployment beneﬁts to after-tax
13B.R. Beneﬁt Union Union Co- Tax
Countries EPL Rate Duration ALMP Density Coverage ordination Wedge
Australia 4 37.5 4 3.0 42.55 3 3 29.8
Austria 16 55 3 13.4 48.70 3 6 54.1
Belgium 17 60 4 9.5 52.4 3 4 48.7
Canada 3 59.5 .8 7.7 35.9 2 2 40.3
Denmark 5 90 2.5 12.9 72.6 3 6 47.6
Finland 10 69 3 12.3 71-5 3 5.5 62.8
France 14 57 3.4 9.24 11.8 3 4 63.3
Germany 15 63 4 16.2 33.6 3 5 52.8
Ireland 12 43.5 4 11.6 51.6 3 2 34
Italy 20 11 .5 9.5 41.5 3 3.5 60.1
Japan 8 60 .5 6.6 26.9 2 4 34.7
Nether. 9 70 3 4.3 28 3 4 57.9
Norway 11 65 1.5 12.3 56.3 3 6 49.3
NZ 2 34 4 9.7 47.6 2 3 35.1
Portugal 18 62.5 .7 9.28 39.1 3 4 35.6
Spain 19 75 3.5 7.5 14.5 3 3 52.2
Sweden 13 80 1.2 59.3 81.8 3 6 69.8
Switzerland 6 70 1 14.8 27.6 2 4 39.3
UK 7 37 4 8.8 42 2.5 2 42.7
USA 1 50 .5 2.6 17.3 1 2 43.2
Source: Nickell [1997]
Table 4: Labor market institutions, average 1983-94
wages. Taxes that aﬀect equally the employed and the unemployed should not
aﬀect the labour supply. On the other hand, when capital is fully mobile and
labour is not, labour taxes will be shifted entirely to workers in the long run so
we should not see a large impact on labour demand either.
Table 4 shows the average values over the period 1983-1994 of all eight labour
market institutions for the 20 OECD countries included in the study.
The ﬁrst column presents the OECD employment protection legislation in-
dex (EPL). The countries of southern Europe have the stricter regulation and
Switzerland, Denmark and the United Kingdom have regulation comparable to
the one in place in USA.
The beneﬁt system shows great variation across countries. On the top one
ﬁnds the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland and Sweden (not so much Norway)
with over 70% of the gross wage in the ﬁrst year of unemployment. However,
these countries have strictly time-limited systems. Italy barely had an unem-
14ployment beneﬁts y s t e ma ta l lf o rm o s to ft h ep o s t w a rp e r i o d .T h en e x tc o l u m n
shows the active labour market policies such as training or assistance with job
search. The clear outlier is Sweden with an impressive expenditure per un-
employed of 60% of GDP per potential worker. Far away follow the rest of
the countries with numbers around 10%. USA and Australia are at the tail in
this particular ranking. In these two countries the activities to become more
employable are left to the individuals with no government intervention.
The next three columns intend to describe the wage setting system of the
countries. It is remarkable that countries with the lowest union membership,
as it is the case for France and Spain, present the largest union coverage, or in
other words, percentage of workers aﬀected by union agreements. In countries
of central and north Europe, wage bargaining is most coordinated. Overall tax
wedge does not present large diﬀerences across countries, although that would
not be the case if we were to look at each of its components.
The ﬁrst inspection of the data seems to indicate the existence of large
institutional diﬀerences across countries.
We have added to the labour market institutions presented above a proxy for
the minimum wage level in the country. The idea is that the same argument that
applies to start-up costs also governs wage ﬂoors. That is, the failure to create
enough jobs in the service sector could be due to the existence of wage ﬂoors,
which prevented small ﬁrms from hiring more people.8 T h ep r o x yi st h er a t i oo f
the ﬁrst percentile of earnings distribution to the ﬁfth percentile or median. It
is shown in Figure 4 for four European countries (France, Germany, Italy, UK),
USA and Japan. The solid line is once again the unweighted average over all
OECD countries. The earnings dispersion data come from the OECD Employ-
ment Outlooks of 1993 and 1996. There is no data for Spain and Ireland, and
data for the rest of the countries is very incomplete. Therefore, any comment
has to be done with caution. The general trend is either a non-signiﬁcant change
over the period or some degree of increase. Particularly, Germany presents a
very strong increase of the ratio during the years of analysis. Austria and, above
all, UK and Portugal are the countries that have decreased the wage ﬂoor.























































































Figure 4: First to ﬁfth decile wage
2.2 Start-up costs
The OECD has recently published an indicator of product market regulations for
21 OECD countries (excluding the new central and eastern European members,
Korea, Mexico and Turkey); unfortunately, only for one year: 1998.9 The data
come from responses of OECD countries to an ad hoc questionnaire and other
sources. The information was grouped in the following regulatory domains:
• State control over business enterprises: Overall size of the public enterprise
sector; existence and extent of special rights over business enterprises;
legislative control over public enterprises; existence of price controls; and
use of command and control regulations.
• Barriers to entrepreneurship: Features of the licensing and permit system;
communication and simpliﬁcation of rules and procedures; administrative
burdens of corporate and sole-proprietors start-ups; industry speciﬁca d -
ministrative burdens; scope of legal barriers to entry and existence of
antitrust exemptions for public enterprises.
9For a full description of the data-set see [19].
16• Barriers to international trade and investment: Barriers to share-ownership
for non-resident operators; discriminatory procedures in international trade
and competition policies; regulatory barriers to trade; and average tariﬀs.
To calculate the overall product market regulation index, each coded indica-
tor was re-scaled to be between 0 and 6. Then the indicators were aggregated
into the summary indicators and ﬁnally into the overall indicator weighting
each component according to its contribution to the overall variance in the data
(factor analysis methodology).
The ”barriers to entrepreneurship” indicator has three sub-domains: Regu-
latory and administrative opacity, barriers to competition, and administrative
burdens on start-ups. The variable ”administrative burdens on start-ups” is
deﬁned as ”administrative burdens for corporations, for sole-proprietorship and
sector speciﬁc burdens,” such as those present in the retail sector. The latter is
a variable of interest regarding the current analysis because it includes admin-
istrative burdens, not only of corporations but also of sole-account proprietors,
which is the legal form that most start-ups assume. This is an advantage over
other possible data sources such as the one oﬀered by Djankov et al. [2000].
In that paper the authors gather data on required procedures governing entry
regulation as well as the cost in time and monetary terms of following those
procedures. However, data refer only to limited liability companies, which is a
handicap if what one want to study is the impact of those procedures on ﬁrm
creation.
Hence, the OECD sub-domain ”administrative burdens on start-ups” will be
used in the analysis to proxy institutions governing ﬁrm creation. Recall that
it is our claim that countries with large administrative burdens on ﬁrm creation
were not able to create enough service jobs to absorb displaced workers from
other economic sectors. However, and for the sake of comparison, the analysis
will also be done using instead the overall index of product market regulations.
Figure 5 shows a snap-shot of the start-up costs in 1998 across OECD coun-
tries. Leading the classiﬁcation is Italy, followed by France and Spain. The












Figure 5: Administrative burdens on start-ups, 1998
2.3 Macroeconomic Shocks
B&W identify three negative macroeconomic shocks, shown in ﬁgure 6, that
might have contributed to the increase in unemployment over the last decades:
the decline in total factor productivity growth, the shift in labour demand, or
equivalently, the increase in the capital share and, ﬁnally, the increase in long-
term interest rate. The original data for the construction of the variables come
from the OECD Business Sector Database. The graphs show the unweighted
average of the OECD countries included in the analysis.
• Total Factor Productivity growth: Calculated as the growth of the Solow
residual for the business sector scaled by the labour share. From the early
70s, the TFP growth, specially in Europe, has slowed down. Annual TFP
growth decreased from an initial level of 5% in 1960s to 2% in the last part
of the 1970s, and then remained stable thereafter. If workers and ﬁrms are
slow to adapt to the slower growth of productivity, proﬁts will decrease,
and so will capital accumulation and employment. This movement would
last as much as expectations take to adjust, then unemployment should
go back to the initial level.
• Real interest rate: This variable is calculated as the long-term nominal
18Annual TFP growth
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Figure 6: Blanchard and Wolfers [2000] macroeconomic shocks
rate on government bonds minus a ﬁve-year average of lagged inﬂation.
The real interest rate was positive in the 1960s and fell sharply in the
second half of the 1970s to become then large and positive until the end
of the 1990s. B&W explain in their paper that they understand the real
interest rate as the capital user cost changing from an exogenous shift in
capital supply or of monetary policy. If that happens, investment and
capital accumulation decrease, and so does employment. The movement
continues until wages have adjusted so the proﬁt level is again equal to
the capital user cost (long-term equilibrium).
• Labour demand shift: Measured in terms of labour share in the business
sector purged of the eﬀect of factor prices. The graph in ﬁgure 6 is normal-
ized to be equal to zero in the ﬁrst period (1960-64 in B&W data-set) and,
by construction, an increase can be interpreted as a proportional decrease
in employment for a given level of output and wages. In most European
19countries capital shares declined in the 1970s and then turned around and
started increasing in the 1980s to be now at a higher level than at the be-
ginning of the period. There are two possible reasons. The ﬁrst possibility
ventured by Blanchard [1999] is a technological change biased to capital.
The second one is a decrease in ﬁrms’ labour hoarding (when ﬁrms employ
too much labour at a given wage), maybe fostered by the historical lose
of power of unions within Europe. Both possibilities lead to a decrease in
labour demand and, therefore, to an increase in unemployment.
Baumol [1967] claimed that the employment shift from non-service to ser-
vices observed in the last decades was the result of the diﬀerential productivity
growth in the diﬀerent economic sectors. To be accurate, one should focus on
the diﬀerential total factor productivity growth in manufacturing and services,
rather than on the diﬀerential labour productivity growth. It is only total factor
productivity changes that one can assume exogenous.10 Labour productivity
depends, among other things, on capital accumulation which is an endogenous
variable. However there is a serious problem of data availability when it comes to
sector total factor productivity. Using the OECD International Sector Database
to construct sector TFP rates we have been able to put together an unbalanced
panel of 13 countries, out of the 20 countries under analysis.11 That comes
to around 50 observations when we run the regressions with ﬁve-year averages.
Taking into account that there are at least 24 explanatory variables in the re-
gression, that panel is clearly not suﬃcient to yield something meaningful about
the impact of shocks and institutions.
Since capital stock changes only slowly, labour productivity is much more
cyclical than total factor productivity. Hence one possible way of proceeding
is to use a smoothed version of labour productivity as a proxy to total factor
productivity. Figure 7 shows the ratio of manufacturing to service smoothed
labour productivity and manufacturing to service total factor productivity evo-
lution over time. The former is the average of 18 countries and the later is the
average of 13 countries.
10We thank Marc Mündler for intensive discussions about this point.
11We followed the methodology of Bernard and Jones [1996a] and [1996b] to construct sector
TFP rates. They ﬁrst calculate a base year manufacturing and service TFP, and then estimate
the rest of the years using a Divisia-Tornquist multifactor productivity rate.
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Figure 7: Manufacturing to service labour and total factor productivity
In spite of the diﬀerent number of countries included, the evolution along
time of both variables is similar; hence the regression with the labour produc-
tivity trend instead of the total factor productivity will point approximately in
the right direction. However, we are aware of potential identiﬁcation problems.
To construct a better panel data-set of sector total factor productivity will be
the next step in our research.
Labour productivity was ﬁrst constructed using data from OECD National
Accounts of sector GDP (given in current prices and national currencies). The
GDP was then expressed in constant 1990 prices using a sector deﬂator and then
expressed in USD using 1990 PPPs. After dividing GDP by the corresponding
sector civilian employment, the variable was smoothed using a Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter.12
3R e s u l t s
The model to be estimated was ﬁrst suggested by Blanchard [1999] in a Baﬃ
Lecture in Rome titled ”European Unemployment: the Role of Shocks and In-
12We used a lambda equal to 100 because the data have annual frequence. We also tried
with other values such as 10 or 400, also used in the literature, and results did not diﬀer.
21stitutions.” In the lecture he defended the interaction between macroeconomic
shocks with various labour market institutions as the best way to explain, ﬁrst
the persistence of the impact of shocks on unemployment, and second, the di-
verse impact of similar shocks in the OECD countries.
3.1 Common unidentiﬁed shocks: a benchmark
3.1.1 Time-constant institutions










where uit is the dependent variable (unemployment, service or manufacturing
employment rates) in country i at time t, ci are 20 country dummies, dt are time
dummies,13 that is, common unidentiﬁed shocks, and X
j
i is the time-constant
value over the period of the institution j in country i. What matters in the
estimation is not the value of the shock or the institution but the interaction
between both of them. This is the most general speciﬁcation since no speciﬁc
shocks are imposed. Therefore it allows to isolate the impact of the institutions
from that of the shocks on the dependent variables. Hence it will be used as a
benchmark.
Notice that each institution is allowed to interact separately with the same
linear combination of shocks. The model is therefore non-linear.14 B&W es-
timate the model using non-linear least squares and do not correct for het-
eroscedasticity present in the regression. Although the coeﬃcients are consis-
tent, and therefore it is legitimate to use them to make estimations, they are not
eﬃcient, that is, with minimum variance, so the standard errors are not correct.
In this paper the model will be estimated using an equivalent maximum likeli-
hood function which allows for White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent variances
and standard errors. The advantage of the White method of correction is that
one does not need to know the exact nature of the heteroscedasticity problem
13The ﬁrst period is left out so it becomes the constant. Therefore the country dummies
can be interpreted as the unemployment (or sector employment rates) in the ﬁrst period.








where we have written the example for two time dummies or shocks (d1 and d2 with co-
eﬃcients β1 and β2) and two institutions (X1
i and X2
i with coeﬃcients γ1 and γ2). But we





22and still make asymptotically valid (i.e. in large samples) statistical inferences
about the true parameter values.
Autocorrelation is only a problem in the regressions with common shocks,
proxied by time dummies. The deviation from the average of the dependent
variable, unemployment rate or sector employment rates, is clearly cyclical. In
the ﬁrst set of regressions time dummies are used, so there is nothing in the
right-hand side of expression 1 to account for that cyclical behavior, hence the
error term is autocorrelated. However, autocorrelation is corrected for when
identiﬁed shocks instead of time dummies are introduced in the regression.
Tables 5, 6 and 7 show respectively the results for the unemployment, ser-
vice and manufacturing regression. Five year averages have been taken (with
the exception of the last period which only comprises 1995-1997) to smooth
out short-term ﬂuctuations. All institutions are expressed in deviations to the
cross-country mean. Wage bargaining coordination and active labour market
policies have been multiplied by (-1) so the expected impact of all institutions
on unemployment is positive. Country and time dummies were included in all
regressions.
Six diﬀerent regressions have been run with each dependent variable. The
ﬁrst one replicates that of B&W. The results are very similar although not ex-
actly the same since the observation period is not the same. The second regres-
sion adds to the eight labour market institutions the administrative burdens on
start-ups provided by the OECD (more concretely, the data is from 1998, which
is taken as the time-constant value of the institution). Many unemployment
studies include regional labour mobility (or immobility), proxied by the extent
of house ownership, as a control variable in unemployment regressions. We do so
as well in the third regression. The fourth regression substitute start-up costs
by the interaction between start-up costs and the initial non-service employ-
ment share of the working age population. We claim that the combination of
large shifts of employment from non-service to service sector with administrative
barriers to ﬁrm creation hampers employment creation, or equivalently, fosters
unemployment. In the ﬁfth regression start-up costs have been substituted by
minimum wages (proxied by the ﬁrst percentile of the earnings distribution to
the median wage). Regression six includes the overall product market regulation
index.
23Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
123 4 56
B. Duration .23 (.04) .26 (.05) .27 (.06) .29 (.05) .19 (.04) .29 (.06)
B.R.Rate .02 (.00) .02 (.01) .03 (.00) .03 (.01) .00 (.00) .02 (.00)
EPL .05 (.02) .01 (.02) -.03 (.03) -.01 (.02) .02 (.02) .03 (.02)
U.Density .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01)
Tax Wedge .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01)
Coordination .26 (.06) .33 (.06) .18 (.06) .38 (.05) .12 (.07) .32 (.05)
U.Coverage .07 (.19) .04 (.19) .11 (.17) .01 (.19) -.07 (.20) .04 (.21)
ALMP .02 (.01) .01 (.01) -.01 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01)
Start-up costs .38 (.12) .58 (.18)
SUC*initial nsv .73 (.16)
Home Ownership 3.1 (.75)
Minimum Wage 1.4 (.9)
Product Market Regul. .49 (.17)
Observations 117 117 111 117 105 117
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When home ownership is introduced, Portugal drops.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 5: Unemployment Regression, common shocks and time-constant institu-
tions
Dependent variable: Service employment ratio
123456
B. Duration -.10 (.03) -.12 (.03) -.10 (.04) -.13 (.03) -.10 (.03) -.10 (.03)
B.R.Rate -.00 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00)
EPL -.03 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.02) -.01 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.04 (.01)
U.Density -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00)
Tax Wedge -.01 (.01) -.00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Coordination -.13 (.04) -.17 (.04) -.10 (.05) -.17 (.04) -.08 (.06) -.13 (.04)
U.Coverage .19 (.14) .19 (.13) .13 (.11) .21 (.13) .15 (.12) .19 (.14)
ALMP -.00 (.01) .00 (.01) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.00 (.01)
Start-up costs -.21 (.09) -.23 (.1)
SUC*initial nsv -.32 (.13)
Home Ownership -1.3 (..44)
Minimum Wage .87 (.83)
Product Market Regul. .01 (.12)
Observations 117 117 111 117 105 117
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When home ownership is introduced, Portugal drops.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 6: Service Regression, common shocks and time-constant institutions
24Dependent variable: Manufacturing employment ratio
123456
B. Duration .19 (.06) .24 (.05) .22 (.06) .26 (.05) .19 (.06) .24 (.07)
B.R.Rate -.01 (.00) .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.00)
EPL -.02 (.02) -.08 (.02) -.04 (.03) -.09 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.03 (.02)
U.Density -.02 (.01) -.00 (.01) .01 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01)
Tax Wedge .01 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01)
Coordination -.17 (.07) -.05 (.06) .08 (.07) -.07 (.06) -.04 (.06) -.12 (.07)
U.Coverage .02 (.22) .00 (.18) -.06 (.20) -.03 (.19) -.10 (.19) .01 (.21)
ALMP -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01)
Start-up costs .61 (.13) .42 (.16)
SUC*initial nsv .86 (.2)
Home Ownership -2.7 (.67)
Minimum Wage 2.6 (.85)
Product Market Regul. .41 (.25)
Observations 117 117 111 117 105 117
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When home ownership is introduced, Portugal drops.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 7: Manufacturing Regression, common shocks and time-constant institu-
tions
There is a lot of information in the three tables shown above so let us take
you slowly through the most interesting results. The ﬁrst important remark
is that the unemployment and the service results look like two sides of the
same coin. When beneﬁt duration, replacement rate, employment protection
legislation and wage bargaining coordination are positive and signiﬁcant in the
unemployment regression, they show as negative and signiﬁcant in the service
regression. This result conﬁrms what the ﬁrst look at the data suggested; there
is a close relationship between unemployment and service employment.
Beneﬁt duration is very robust and signiﬁcant in all regressions. Countries
where unemployed receive long beneﬁts experience more unemployment. More
interesting may be the service and manufacturing regressions. Countries with
longer beneﬁts than average are countries with less service and more manufac-
turing employment.
The positive sign of beneﬁt duration, the case is the same for the minimum
wage, in the manufacturing regression is a very robust, and interesting, result.
It has been reported before that high and long unemployment beneﬁts increase
the reservation wage of workers. A high reservation wage means that workers
25are less willing to accept low-paid jobs in the service sector and prefer instead to
queue in the manufacturing sector. Thus, the shift from non-service to service
economy is delayed.
Consequently the negative sign of beneﬁt duration in the service regression
is not surprising. However, there could be something else to the negative impact
of beneﬁts on service employment. The report of the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor of 2001 found that countries with generous unemployment insurance
systems were systematically less ”entrepreneurial”.15 This was explained in the
f o l l o w i n gw a y :T h e r ea r et w ot y p e so fs t a r t - u p s . O n et y p ei st h er e s u l to fa
business opportunity and the other type is the result of desperation, of the
need to make a living. Generous beneﬁt systems are taking away part of the
desperation of the unemployed and, therefore, decreasing the second type of
start-ups. Hence, if we accept the intimate connection between start-ups and
service sector job creation, generous beneﬁt systems can be expected to decrease
service employment.
Long unemployment beneﬁt sa n dh i g hw a g eﬂoors are normally the result
of strong union power in the country. The regressions include three bargaining
related variables: union density, union coverage and wage bargaining coordina-
tion. The ﬁrst remarkable fact is the lack of signiﬁcance over all speciﬁcations
of union coverage. The second remark is that both union density and wage
bargaining coordination aﬀect signiﬁcantly service employment and unemploy-
ment, and are relatively unimportant in explaining manufacturing employment.
This result is consistent with the observed impact of beneﬁts and minimum
wages: unionized countries have higher union premium, i.e. the relative wage in
manufacturing is higher, which means that migration to the service sector has
been slower.
Start-up costs, and the overall index of product market regulations, have a
consistent positive and signiﬁcant sign in the unemployment regression. The
variable star-up costs is also negative in the service regression and positive in
the manufacturing regression. Countries where starting a business is cumber-
some have paid in terms of service employment, and of unemployment. The
results are reinforced when instead of start-up costs we run the regression with
15The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor is an international project led by Paul Reynolds
(Babson College and the London Business School) aimed at measuring entrepreneurship across
countries in a comparable way. See www.gemconsortium.org.
26the interaction of start-up costs with initial non-service employment. Start-up
costs have a higher impact when the 1970 share of population of working age
outside the service sector is larger. In other words, countries that had to go a
long way from non-service to service economies paid a higher price in terms of
unemployment for institutions that delayed the sectorial shift.
The impact of the overall index of product market regulations, however,
diﬀers from the one of start-up costs in both sector employment regressions.
It is not signiﬁcant in the service regression and it is signiﬁcant only at 11%
signiﬁcance level (although positive, as the start-up costs) in the manufactur-
ing one. Recall that the overall OECD index groups regulations that cover
a much wider range of economic activities than start-up costs, such as state
control over the private sector, barriers to international trade or existence of
anti-trust exemptions for public enterprises. Some of those domains are not, or
negatively, correlated to start-up costs so they are capturing diﬀerent phenom-
ena.16 Since service employment takes place at small local ﬁrms, some of the
regulations included in the overall index do not apply, which could explain the
non-signiﬁcance of the variable in the service regression.
When start-up costs (or the interaction term) are included in the unem-
ployment regression, several labour market institution variables drop. Most
dramatic is the eﬀect of start-up costs on employment protection legislation.
Once start-up costs are introduced, EPL does not show up as signiﬁcant again.
This is so in almost all speciﬁcations we tried and therefore very robust, and
is consistent with evidence based on job ﬂows. The high correlation between
start-up costs and EPL (correlation coeﬃcient of 0.73) may explain the signif-
icance of EPL in other aggregate studies. When minimum wages are included,
instead of start-up costs, EPL reappears as signiﬁcant, which seems to conﬁrm
the previous remark.
To give an idea of the magnitude of the coeﬃcients, Table 8 reproduces in
its second column the estimation results for the model of unemployment with
start-up costs (Table 5, regression 2). The third column of the table shows
the variation range of each independent variable. The variation is in terms of
deviations to the cross-country mean, which is taken as reference point. The
16For example, barriers to trade and start-up costs have a correlation coeﬃcient equal to
(-.03). The two sub-domain of barriers to entrepreneurship, ”administrative opcity” and
”administrative burdens on start-ups,” have a correlation coeﬃcient of (-.17).
27Coeﬃcients Range of variation Implied range
from Table 5, of institution of eﬀect of shock
Variable column (2) minimum maximum minimum maximum
Time eﬀect .07
B. Duration .26 -1.93 1.57 -.50 .41
B.R. Rate .02 -46.35 32.65 -1.11 .78
U.Density .02 -30.98 39.02 -.52 .65
Coordination .33 -2.05 1.95 -.68 .65
Start-up costs .38 -1.49 2.80 -.57 1.07
Note: Only coeﬃcients signiﬁcant at 10% are included in table
Table 8: Estimated impact of institutions on unemployment after a common
shock
fourth column shows the impact of the same shock on the country with the
”best” and the ”worst” institutional setting, i.e. on the countries with the largest
-negative and positive- deviations to the cross-country mean. For example,
Denmark is the country with the lowest start-up costs and Italy the one with
the ”worst” or largest value of the institution among all countries in the sample.
The estimations indicate that the time dummy would increase unemployment
by 7% in a country with the average value of all institutions. The country with
the highest start-up costs would have an additional -relative to the country with
average start-up costs- increase in unemployment of 1.07%. Denmark, however,
would see an increase in unemployment 0.57% smaller than the country with
the average value of start-up costs.
Take the case of a particular country, for example Italy. The average un-
employment rate in the ﬁrst period of analysis, 1970-1975, was of 4%. During
the last period, 1995-1997, the average rate was 12%. Hence unemployment
increased 8 percentage points over the period of analysis. The model with com-
mon shocks and time-constant institutions predicts an unemployment increase
of 6.1% in that same period. As the table above shows, 7 percentage points of
that predicted increase are due to time shocks. The remaining responds to the
Italian speciﬁc institutional framework. Table 9 shows the contribution to the
predicted change in unemployment of each of the institutions analyzed in the
paper for Italy and other ﬁve OECD countries.
Beneﬁt duration and replacement rates have been merged into ”Beneﬁts y s -
tem” and union coverage, union density and wage bargaining coordination con-
28Unemployment: common shocks Belgium Finland Italy Japan UK USA
Actual increase, 1970-97 12% 15% 8% 2% 5% 0%
Predicted increase, 1970-97 14.7% 11% 6.1% 1.7% 7.8% 0.1%
Percentage explained by time 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
(given average institutions)
Percentage explained by institutions 7.7% 3.9% -0.9% -5.3% 0.8% -6.9%
Beneﬁt system 3.3% 3% -11.3% -3.1% -0.6% -4.7%
EPL 0.5% -0.04% 0.8% -0.2% -0.3% -0.8%
Union activity 1.1% -1.2% 1% -2.2% 4.4% 1.1%
Tax Wedge 0.1% 0.02% 0.9% -0.9% -0.3% -0.3%
ALMP 0.2% -0.01% 0.2% 0.5% 0.3% 0.8%
Start-up Costs 2.4% 0% 7.5% 0.5% -2.7% -3%
Table 9: Predicted increase in unemployment: contribution of institutions
form the institution ”Union activity.” Following with the example of Italy, it
is known that Italy barely had an unemployment beneﬁts y s t e ma ta l lf o rm o s t
of the postwar period, hence the negative contribution to the unemployment
increase over the period. Union activity, employment protection legislation, the
tax wedge and active labour market policies have all marginally contributed
to the unemployment rise in Italy, according to our estimations. The single
institution that can explain a substantial increase in Italian unemployment is
start-up costs.
Turning to the remarkable unemployment performance of the United States,
very well predicted by the model, we can see that it is almost entirely due
to the lower than average beneﬁt system and start-up costs. Belgium is the
opposite case: its bad unemployment records are due to unemployment beneﬁts
and start-up costs well above the OECD average.
Hence, according to the model with common shocks and time-constant in-
stitutions, the two single labour market institutions that have contributed the
most to the explanation of the diverse OECD unemployment evolution are the
beneﬁts y s t e m( b e n e ﬁt duration and replacement rate) and the start-up costs
of ﬁrms.
293.1.2 Time-varying institutions
All regressions have also been run with time-varying institutions. The data
come from N&N.1718 There are at least three problems with those regressions,
though. First, there are comparable start-up cost data across OECD countries
for one year only, 1998. Moreover, there are so many missing values in the
measure of minimum wages that it would be advisable to use the time-constant
value of minimum wage instead of the time-varying one. Therefore, start-up
costs and the wage ﬂoor are time-constant while all the rest of the variables
are time-varying (although some do not vary that much). The second, smaller,
drawback is that time-varying data are available only for six labour market in-
stitutions, instead of the eight used above. Union coverage and active labour
market policies are left out of the time-varying analysis. Given that the ex-
planatory variables are not entirely independent one of another, this omission
could aﬀect the results.
Last but not least, institutions change very slowly over time so the value
of one institution in a country at a certain period is certainly correlated with
the value of the same institution at the previous or posterior period. This
means that the institutions’ coeﬃcients could be biased. Indeed, one general
feature of all regressions using time-varying data on institutions is that the
estimated coeﬃcients are larger, sometimes much larger, than those estimated
with time-constant institutions. We suspect that this problem could be behind
some change of signs. Hence, all interpretations have to be done with caution.
In order not to overload the text, and the reader, the tables with the esti-
mations of the model with time-varying institutions are shown in the appendix.
The unemployment and manufacturing regressions replicate in general terms
those using time-constant institutions. Beneﬁt duration and replacement rate
are positive and signiﬁcant and EPL drops when start-up costs are introduced
in the unemployment regression. Start-up costs are positive and signiﬁcant
(although this is hardly surprisingly since their value is time-constant, as before)
and the bargaining variables seem to increase, when interacted with shocks,
17Although the deﬁnition and construction of the variables in N&N are very similar to the
ones in B&W, there are slight diﬀerences. Maybe the most important one is the construction
of the beneﬁt duration index. B&W use the number of years of entitlement. N&N use a
weighted average of the replacement rates at diﬀerent moments of the unemployment spell.
18We have run the regressions with yearly data (485 observations) and ﬁve-year average
periods as before. The results are very similar in both cases.
30unemployment. The only change in the unemployment regression is to be found
in the impact of the tax wedge on unemployment, now the coeﬃcient being
negative and signiﬁcant. The reason could be slight measurement diﬀerences
in the construction of the variable. Those diﬀerences aﬀect fundamentally the
value of the tax wedge in Spain, and since the Spanish unemployment is very
large, that aﬀects the average impact of the tax wedge on unemployment. Once
Spain is dropped from the regression, the tax wedge shows a positive coeﬃcient
as with time-constant institutions.
The beneﬁt replacement rate and EPL, which were signiﬁcantly decreas-
ing service employment with time-constant institutions, are now positive and,
in some regressions, signiﬁcant. That is not the result of measurement diﬀer-
ences because if the regression is run with N&N data averaged over time, both
variables have a negative coeﬃcient, as before. There are three possible ex-
planations to the positive sign of EPL and beneﬁt replacement rate: the time
evolution of both variables has been favorable to service job creation; there is
a spurious relationship between the rise in service employment and the rise in
both institutions; or there is a problem of biased coeﬃcients.
To include in the analysis the variation over time of labour and product
market institutions is necessary. This is only a ﬁrst attempt in that direction,
which shows that the main results obtained with time-constant institutions are
robust. But better data and further econometric work are called for.
3.2 Identiﬁed shocks
We now turn to identify those shocks that before were left unidentiﬁed and
















where Skit is shock k in country i at time t. One can think about a composite
of shocks that interacts with the labour market institutions. There are several
candidates for ”bad” shocks that might be responsible for the observed increase
in unemployment in the OECD countries in the last three decades.
Blanchard [1999] and then B&W identify three of those shocks: a slowdown
in the total factor productivity growth; an increase in the long-term real interest
rate; and ﬁnally, an increase in the capital share, or equivalently, a negative shift
31of labour demand. The focus of this paper is on sector diﬀerential productivity
growth rather than on aggregate productivity slowdown. It is argued that man-
ufacturing and service diﬀerential productivity growth is behind the observed
employment shift to the service sector in developed economies. We claim that
countries that did not have friendly institutions to service job creation were not
able to absorb displaced workers from other sectors which resulted in higher
unemployment.
To test that claim, the ﬁrst of B&W shocks, aggregate TFP growth, is
substituted by the manufacturing to service TFP. Then the interaction of shocks
with the labour market institutions and start-up costs is used as explanatory
variables in the unemployment and sector employment regressions. For the
sake of comparison we have run all regressions using aggregate TFP growth as
in B&W. Results can be found in the appendix.
Sector TFP is proxied by the ”ﬁltered” sector labour productivity or labour
productivity trend, as we explained with some detail in the section dedicated
to the description of the data. In general terms the ﬁrst and last period of data
are missing for all countries, Ireland and Switzerland drop totally and Spain
has only two periods of data available. Our data set is therefore badly reduced
(from 106 to 78 observation in the best case). As a result we will neither run the
regressions controlling for house ownership nor the regressions with time-varying
institutions.19
Tables 10, 11 and 12 show the estimation results of the model with three
identiﬁed shocks, labour demand shift, long-term interest rate, and manufactur-
ing to service labour productivity, and time-constant institutions. Column (1)
shows the estimation of the model only with labour market institutions, column
(2) includes start-up costs, column (3) substitutes start-up costs by minimum
wages, and column (4) includes the OECD overall index of product market
regulation, in place of the administrative burdens on start-ups.
All the three shocks are entered in levels and can be interpreted as deviations
to the value in the ﬁrst period of analysis, or as deviations to the country average.
A Wald test to test for their joint signiﬁcance has been performed and in all
cases we can reject the hypotheses of all coeﬃcients being zero.
19When house ownership is controlled for, Portugal drops. The number of observations in
the regression with identiﬁed shocks and time-varying institutions would be 74 in the best of
the cases.
32Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
1234
L a b o u rD e m a n dS h i f t . 0 9( . 0 7) . 0 7( . 0 5 ) . 0 9( . 0 6 ) . 0 5( . 0 6 )
LR interest rate .04 (.09) .04 (.09) .03 (.09) .05 (.09)
Manufacturing to service L.Prod. .07 (.01) .07 (.01) .07 (.01) .08 (.01)
B. Duration .26 (.11) .35 (.11) .29 (.11) .44 (.12)
B.R.Rate -.02 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01)
EPL .02 (.04) -.12 (.08) .04 (.04) -.09 (.06)
U.Density .04 (.01) .05 (.01) .05 (.01) .02 (.01)
Tax Wedge -.03 (.02) -.05 (.02) -.03 (.02) -.03 (.01)
Coordination .09 (.21) .19 (.19) .10 (.18) .04 (.18)
U.Coverage -.26 (.42) -.32 (.43) -.07 (.44) -.11 (.38)
ALMP -.00 (-01) -.03 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.03 (.01)
Start-up costs .97 (.52)
Minimum Wage -4.2 (2.1)
Product Market Regulation 1.5 (.68)
W a l d T e s t ( 3 s h o c k s ) 8 37 48 39 2
Observations 78 78 76 78
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 10: Unemployment Regression: Identiﬁed shocks and time-constant in-
stitutions
Dependent variable: Service employment ratio
1234
Labour Demand Shift .16 (.07) .26 (.13) .15 (.07) .20 (.09)
LR interest rate .29 (.11) .30 (.14) .28 (.11) .29 (.12)
Manufacturing to service L.Prod. .16 (.01) .16 (.01) .17 (.02) .15 (.02)
B. Duration -.09 (.04) -.12 (.04) -.07 (.05) -.14 (.05)
B.R.Rate .00 (.00) -.01 (.01) .00 (.02) .00 (.00)
EPL -.03 (.02) .07 (.03) -.03 (.02) .00 (.04)
U.Density -.01 (.01) -.01 (.00) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01)
Tax Wedge -.01 (.01) .00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Coordination .09 (.11) .00 (.09) .08 (.13) .07 (.11)
U.Coverage -.11 (.29) -.05 (.29) -.02 (.32) -.18 (.32)
ALMP .00 (.01) .02 (.01) .00 (.01) .01 (.01)
Start-up costs -.66 (.26)
Minimum Wage -2.0 (2.6)
P r o d u c tM a r k e tR e g u l a t i o n - . 5 0( . 3 9 )
Wald Test (3 shocks) 278 328 183 278
Observations 78 78 76 78
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 11: Service Regression: Identiﬁed shocks and time-constant institutions
33Dependent variable: Manufacturing employment ratio
1234
Labour Demand Shift .03 (.05) .04 (.05) .03 (.05) .05 (.05)
LR interest rate -.05 (.08) -.05 (.08) -.06 (.09) -.05 (.08)
Manufacturing to service L.Prod. -.12 (.01) -.12 (.01) -.12 (.01) -.12 (.01)
B. Duration .11 (.06) .13 (.07) .11 (.06) .17 (.07)
B.R.Rate -.02 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01)
EPL -.03 (.01) -.07 (.03) -.04 (.01) -.07 (.03)
U.Density .00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01)
Tax Wedge -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01)
Coordination .07 (.13) .11 (.10) .09 (.14) .07 (.12)
U.Coverage .22 (.19) .22 (.18) .24 (.23) .24 (.19)
ALMP -.03 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.04 (.01)
Start-up costs .21 (.22)
Minimum Wage .29 (1.1)
Product Market Regulation .41 (.36)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 165 162 143 164
Observations 78 78 76 78
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop
Table 12: Manufacturing Regression: Identiﬁed shocks and time-constant insti-
tutions
34The ﬁrst remarkable thing is that the labour demand shift and the long-
term interest rate are not signiﬁcant in the unemployment and manufacturing
regressions when sector labour productivity is controlled for.20 On the other
hand, the manufacturing to service labour productivity is always very signiﬁ-
cant (t-statistics of about 10 in absolute value). That shock is positive in the
unemployment regression, positive in the service regression and negative in the
manufacturing regression. All signs are as expected since, according to Baumol
[1967], the increase in manufacturing productivity relative to service caused the
shift of employment from non-service to service sectors. Hence it explains the
increase in service employment and the decrease in manufacturing employment.
The second remarkable issue is to be found in the service regression. It has been
mentioned that the increase in manufacturing to service labour productivity in-
creases signiﬁcantly service employment, as expected. The striking thing is that
the two other shocks included in the analysis, labour demand shift and increase
in the interest rate, also increase signiﬁcantly service employment. The most
likely explanation is the existence of a spurious relationship between the growth
in service employment and the growth in the capital share and interest rate.
Turning directly to the administrative burdens on start-ups, the focus of this
paper, we observe the following. The coeﬃcient of start-up costs is higher than
with unidentiﬁed shocks in all regressions. It is positive and signiﬁcant at 10%
signiﬁcance level in the unemployment regression, very signiﬁcant and negative,
in the service regression, and positive but non-signiﬁcant in the manufacturing
regression. What these results are telling us is that the shift of employment
from non-service to service activities had a very high cost in terms of service
employment, reﬂected in overall unemployment, in countries where starting a
business is more cumbersome than average.
The beauty is that when the regression is run with the aggregate TFP growth,
as in Blanchard and Wolfers [2000], there is no evidence that countries with more
administrative burdens on ﬁrm creation than the average have a worse service
employment performance. Burdens on ﬁrm creation become signiﬁcant only
when interacted with a shock that caused the relocation of large numbers of
20When aggregate TFP growth is included instead, the long-term interest rate is signiﬁcant
in all regressions. Labour demand shift is close to signiﬁcance at 10% level in the unem-
ployment regression. B&W found the labour demand shift to be signiﬁcant. However when
heteroscedasticity is controlled for, the labour demand shift loses its signiﬁcance.
35workers in the service sector.
When the overall product market regulation index is included instead of
start-up costs, the results change slightly. Product market regulations, when
interacted with the sector diﬀerential productivity, increase signiﬁcantly unem-
ployment (this result is more signiﬁcant than when start-up costs were included).
The diﬀerence, as it was the case when regressions were run with time dummies,
is to be found in the service regression, where product market regulations have
an o n - s i g n i ﬁcant negative coeﬃcient.
Countries with longer beneﬁts than average create less jobs in the service
sector (where the private initiative is very important), have a larger share of the
working age population employed in the manufacturing ﬁrms and experience,
in general, higher unemployment than an average country.
With respect to the rest of the institutions, the most remarkable changes
from before are as follow. First, EPL is non-signiﬁcant from the beginning in
the unemployment regression (before it was signiﬁcant when start-up costs were
excluded). In the service regression, EPL goes from being negative and signiﬁ-
cant without start-up costs to positive and signiﬁcant when they are included.
When minimum wages are controlled for instead, the sign is again negative (al-
though non-signiﬁcant). Therefore the behavior observed before, when the EPL
index systematically dropped out when start-up costs were introduced, is here
ampliﬁed.
To get a feeling of the contribution of the three shocks analyzed in the section
to the increase in unemployment, let us take a look in more detail to Italy —
a country that has experienced a large relocation of workers into the service
sector. The predicted rise of Italian unemployment over the period is of 7.25%,
much closer to the actual 8% than the predicted increase of the model with
common unidentiﬁed shocks. Of those 7.25 percentage points, shocks (given
average institutions) can explain a rise equal to 5.7% and institutions explain
the remaining 1.5%. The shift of employment to the service sector explains
alone 5% points of the 5.7% corresponding to the shocks.
The large contribution of that shock is a feature of every country; in average
accounts for around 60% of the total predicted change in unemployment. That
ﬁgure is quite close to the one given by Marimon and Zilibotti [1998], who cal-
culated that almost 80% of the long-run employment diﬀerential growth across
36Unemployment: Identiﬁed shocks Belgium Finland Italy Japan UK USA
Actual increase, 1970-97 12% 15% 8% 2% 5% 0%
Predicted increase, 1970-97 10% 13.3% 7.3% 1% 4.4% -0.2%
Percentage explained by shocks 5.2% 8.2% 5.7% 1.5% 2.8% 3%
(given average institutions)
Labour Demand Shift -0.3% 0.1% 0.4% -0.1% -0.3% 0.4%
Long-term Interest Rate 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Manufacturing to service productivity 5.4% 7.9% 5.1% 1.5% 3% 2.5%
Percentage explained by institutions 4.8% 5.1% 1.5% -0.5% 1.7% -3.2%
Beneﬁt system 2.8% 1.3% -3.2% -1.1% 1.6% -2%
EPL* -4.1% 0.4% -6.6% 0.5% 1.1% 3.4%
Union Activity* 2.3% 9.7% -0.3% -1% 1.2% -1.3%
Tax wedge -0.2% -5.6% -3.4% 1% 0.7% 0.7%
ALMP -0.3% 0.1% -0.4% -0.2% -0.2% -0.7%
Start-up costs 4.4% -0.3% 15.3% 0.3% -2.8% -3.3%
Institutions with * are non-signiﬁcant at 10% signiﬁcance level
Table 13: Predicted increase in unemployment: contribution of shocks and
institutions
countries and industries is accounted by diﬀerent initial distribution of labour
across industries and only 20% by country eﬀects.
We turn now to the contribution of the diﬀerent institutions to the unemploy-
ment increase over the period, for Italy and ﬁve other OECD countries. Table
13 shows that the predictive power of the regression with identiﬁed shocks and
time-constant institutions is generally better than the one with common shocks.
The ﬁg u r e si nt h et a b l eh a v et ob et a k e nw i t he x t r e m ec a u t i o n :e m p l o y m e n t
protection legislation is non-signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and has reverse
sign. So are two of the three variables included in the union activity group. Of
the rest of signiﬁcant variables, ALMP and the tax wedge have a negative sign,
instead of the expected positive one, in the regression.
There is a general decrease in the contribution to the unemployment change
of the beneﬁt system (i.e. in Italy, now the ﬁgure is -3.2%, compared to the
-11.28% in the regression with common unidentiﬁed shocks) now that shocks
have been identiﬁed. Secondly, the contribution of start-up costs, now that are
interacted with identiﬁed shocks, to the unemployment rise is very large. That
contribution is two times as large as the already important contribution of start-
up costs when shocks were not speciﬁed in Italy and Belgium, and approximately
the same in Finland, Japan, UK and USA.
37Taking the results with caution due to the numerous missing values in the
data-set, start-up costs emerge as a relevant variable to explain unemployment
given the shift of employment from non-services to services experienced by most
western economies over the last decades.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The current paper intends to make a contribution to the literature aimed at
explaining the rise, and consequent evolution, of unemployment since the 1970s
in most western economies. For that purpose, the paper of Blanchard and
Wolfers [2000], where unemployment is explained as the result of interactions
between shocks and labour market institut i o n s ,i se x t e n d e di nt w ow a y s .F i r s t ,
a macroeconomic shock surprisingly neglected in the literature is introduced,
namely, the diﬀerential productivity growth in the manufacturing and the ser-
vice sector. The importance of that shock is that it helps to explain the observed
employment shift from non-services to the service sector. We argue that coun-
tries that had unfriendly institutions to service job creation were not able to
have a smooth transition towards a service economy with the result of higher
unemployment. Given the characteristics of the service employment, created
in small ﬁrms at the local level, one institution that possibly hampered service
employment is the administrative burdens on ﬁrm creation. Thus the second
contribution of the paper is to include in the analysis, along with the usual
suspects, the start-up costs of ﬁrms.
The estimations seem to support the working hypotheses of the paper: coun-
tries with higher start-up costs have signiﬁcantly lower service employment and
higher unemployment. This is so when no shocks are speciﬁed, and time dum-
mies are included instead, and when the shocks are identiﬁed and include the
diﬀerential productivity growth in manufacturing and services.
The ﬁrst set of regressions use time dummies instead of fully speciﬁed shocks
to be able to isolate the impact of the institutions from that of shocks on un-
employment. The time dummies alone would be able to explain an increase in
unemployment of 7 percentage points in a country with the cross-country av-
erage value of institutions. The country with the highest start-up costs among
all OECD countries, Italy, would be penalized with an additional increase in
unemployment of 1.07%. When the contribution of each institution to the pre-
38dicted increase in unemployment is estimated for the case of Italy, start-up costs
emerge as the largest contributor to the unemployment rise. On the other hand,
employment protection legislation, one of the traditional main suspects, appears
to have contributed in less than 1 percentage point to the overall increase.
Among the three macroeconomic shocks included in the analysis, shift in
labour demand, increase in the interest rate and change in the manufacturing to
service labour productivity, the only signiﬁcant one is the latter. Again looking
at the case of Italy, it has been estimated that the shift of employment to the
service sector can explain alone 5 percentage points of the overall predicted
increase in unemployment, which accounts for around 60% of the total. The
other two shocks together can hardly explain one percent of the unemployment
increase.
The analysis of the contribution of each institution, when interacted with
the shocks, has to be taken with extreme caution given the restricted sample
size. Still, start-up costs emerge again as the institution that has contributed
the most to the predicted unemployment increase. In the case of Italy, that
contribution is now twice as large as it was when no shocks were speciﬁed and
time dummies were used instead.
In spite of the incomplete data on sector labour productivity, the analy-
sis shows that the administrative burdens on ﬁrm creation and other product
market regulations can be blamed for part of the increase in unemployment ex-
perienced by most western economies in the last three decades. That impact is
specially important when the size of the employment shift from the agriculture
and industry sector into the service sector is taken into account.
Spain, Italy or France are countries with unfriendly institutions when it
comes to service job creation. Thus, policy intervention in this respect could
potentially have an important impact on their labour market performance.
Further work is needed to improve the data-set, with better sector TFP data
and time-varying information on start-up costs. One of the secondary results
obtained from the analysis concerns the drop in signiﬁcance of the employment
protection legislation index whenever star t - u pc o s t sa r ei n c l u d e di nt h er e g r e s -
sions. That result is very robust and responds to the high correlation found
between start-up costs and EPL. The traditional signiﬁcance of the employ-
ment protection legislation in aggregate studies trying to explain the rise of
39unemployment could then be just the reﬂection of the high correlation between
start-up costs and EPL. Further research into this issue would be also very
interesting.
40Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
123456
B. Duration .69 (.24) .87 (.19) .85 (.20) .87 (.19) .77 (.24) .62 (.27)
B.R.Rate .55 (.45) 1.2 (.47 2.3 (.49) 1.4 (.51) -.55 (.44) .61 (.49)
EPL .33 (.20) -.15 (.25) .13 (.24) -.29 (.24) .12 (.14) .45 (.28)
U.Density -.17 (.56) 1.0 (.56) .55 (.53) 1.2 (.51) .63 (.63) -.26 (.61)
Tax Wedge .08 (.65) -1.4 (.57) -1.4 (.61) -1.7 (.57) .69 (.70) .35 (.73)
Coordination -.20 (.13) -.22 (.12) -.20 (.12) -.19 (.12) -.14 (.13) -.22 (.13)
Start-up costs .48 (.10) .36 (.11)
SUC*initial nsv .74 (.13)
Home Ownership 3.4 (.78)
Minimum Wage .62 (1.31)
Product Market Regul. -.29 (.29)
Observations 106 106 100 106 94 106
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Coeﬃcients non-signiﬁcant at 10%
signiﬁcance levelare omitted. . When home ownership is introduced, Portugal
drops. When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 14: Unemployment Regression: Common shocks and time-varying insti-
tutions
5A p p e n d i x
Tables 14, 15 and 16 show the results of the regressions with common unidenti-
ﬁed shocks (time dummies) and time-varying institutions. Please keep in mind
that we do not have time-varying data for start-up costs and minimum wages.
The ﬁrst column of the table includes only labour market institutions (there
are no data for ALMP and union coverage); the second column adds to the
six labour market institutions the start-up costs; the third column controls for
regional mobility; the fourth column substitutes start-ups by the interaction of
start-ups with the initial non-service employment rate; column ﬁve substitutes
start-up costs by the wage ﬂoor; and ﬁnally, column six includes the overall
OECD product market regulation index. All regressions include time and coun-
try dummies.
Table 17, 18 and 19 show the results of the regressions using the shocks iden-
tiﬁed by B&W, i.e. labour demand shift, long-term interest rate and aggregate
TFP growth. The ﬁrst column shows the results of the model only with labour
market institutions; column two includes start-up costs; column three substi-
tutes start-up costs by the wage ﬂoor; and ﬁnally, the fourth column includes
41Dependent variable: Service employment ratio
123456
B. Duration -.00 (.15) -.08 (.13) -.02 (.15) -.06 (.13) -.07 (.14) .03 (.16)
B.R.Rate .77 (.29) .43 (.38) .06 (.32) .38 (.39) 1.0 (.19) .69 (.32)
EPL .02 (.11) .27 (.17) .27 (.17) .32 (.16) .02 (.12) -.06 (.14)
U.Density -.27 (.37) -1.1 (.39) -.81 (.46) -1.2 (.42) -.82 (.47) -.20 (.38)
Tax Wedge -.53 (.41) .56 (.58) .26 (.49) .74 (.62) -.48 (.54) -.72 (.45)
Coordination -.06 (.07) -.02 (.07) -.07 (.06) -.03 (.07) -.10 (.07) -.06 (.07)
Start-up costs -.27 (.08) -.22 (.08)
SUC*initial nsv -.39 (.12)
Home Ownership -1.1 (.46)
Minimum Wage 1.1 (.93)
Product Market Regul. .19 (.20)
Observations 106 106 100 106 94 106
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Coeﬃcients non-signiﬁcant at 10%
signiﬁcance levelare omitted. . When home ownership is introduced, Portugal
drops. When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 15: Service Regression: Common shocks and time-varying institutions
Dependent variable: Manufacturing employment ratio
123456
B. Duration .23 (.25) .41 (.18) .50 (.16) .39 (.18) .06 (.24) .28 (.22)
B.R.Rate -.48 (.48) .19 (.39) -.09 (.33) .21 (.40) -1.5 (.42) -.57 (.41)
EPL .05 (.22) -.51 (.23) -.06 (.16) -.55 (.25) -.46 (.23) -.07 (.28)
U.Density -.24 (.38) .97 (.36) .76 (.36) .91 (.38) -1.1 (.40) -.16 (.39)
Tax Wedge 1.5 (.73) .08 (.63) -.58 (.16) .17 (.66) 1.9 (.58) 1.3 (.77)
Coordination -.05 (.15) -.05 (.13) -.22 (.08) -.02 (.14) .09 (.14) -.04 (.15)
Start-up costs .50 (.10) .35 (.08)
SUC*initial nsv .64 (.13)
Home Ownership -1.7 (.47)
Minimum Wage 5.2 (.99)
Product Market Regul. .26 (.27))
Observations 106 106 100 106 94 106
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Coeﬃcients non-signiﬁcant at 10%
signiﬁcance levelare omitted. . When home ownership is introduced, Portugal
drops. When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 16: Manufacturing Regression: Common shocks and time-varying insti-
tutions
42Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
1234
Labour Demand Shift .18 (.12 ) .18 (.11) .20 (.12) .18 (.12)
LR interest rate .43 (.12) .43 (.12) .43 (.11) .43 (.12)
Annual TFP growth .51 (.24) .51 (.22) .43 (.30) .50 (.24)
B. Duration .38 (.09) .41 (.09) .37 (.11) .39 (.10)
B.R.Rate .02 (.01) .04 (.01) .01 (.02) .02 (.01)
EPL .07 (.04) .00 (.04) .06 (.09) .07 (.04)
U.Density .04 (.02) .05 (.02) .04 (.03) .04 (.02)
Tax Wedge .06 (.02) .03 (.02) .04 (.02) .05 (.02)
Coordination .50 (.15) .57 (.15) .14 (.31) .52 (.17)
U.Coverage -.36 (.37) -.22 (.37) -.34 (.57) -.34 (.38)
ALMP .02 (.02) .01 (.03) .05 (.04) .02 (.02)
Start-up costs .68 (.26)
Minimum Wage -2.9 (2.4)
Product Market Regulation .09 (.34)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 103 109 47 83
Observations 113 113 80 113
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 17: Unemployment Regressions: with aggregate TFP growth
the overall OECD product market regulation index.
All the three shocks are entered in levels and can be interpreted as deviations
to the value in the ﬁrst period of analysis, or as deviations to the country average.
All shocks are imputed so their expected impact on unemployment is positive,
which means that TFP growth has been multiplied by (-1).
43Dependent variable: Service employment ratio
1234
Labour Demand Shift .04 (.11 ) .05 (.13) .56 (.15) .06 (.15)
LR interest rate 1.1 (.16) 1.1 (.18) .74 (.15) 1.1 (.18)
Annual TFP growth .67 (.32) .66 (.32) .69 (.27) .71 (.35)
B. Duration -.12 (.06) -.14 (.06) .05 (.06) -.14 (.06)
B.R.Rate .00 (.01) -.01 (.01) .00 (.00) .00 (.01)
EPL -.05 (.03) -.02 (.04) -.02 (.03) -.04 (.03)
U.Density -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Tax Wedge .01 (.01) .02 (.02) .01 (.01) .01 (.02)
Coordination -.09 (.13) -.14 (.14) -.13 (.18) -.14 (.15)
U.Coverage .10 (.31) .02 (.30) -.16 (.32) .05 (.31)
ALMP -.01 (-02) -.00 (.02) .02 (.01) -.01 (.02)
Start-up costs -.30 (.31)
Minimum Wage .39 (2.3)
Product Market Regulation -.23 (.49)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 149 159 89 128
Observations 113 113 80 113
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 18: Service Regression: with aggregate TFP growth
Dependent variable: Manufacturing employment ratio
1234
Labour Demand Shift .08 (.10 ) .09 (.08) -.14 (.12) .07 (.12)
LR interest rate -.61 (.09) -.60 (.08) -.60 (.10) -.61 (.09)
Annual TFP growth -.42 (.18) -.42 (.17) -.53 (.18) -.43 (.19)
B. Duration .19 (.08) .22 (.08) .28 (.08) .18 (.10)
B.R.Rate -.01 (.01) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) -.01 (.01)
EPL -.01 (.03) -.07 (.04) .01 (.04) —.00 (.04)
U.Density -.01 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Tax Wedge .02 (.01) .00 (.02) .03 (.01) .02 (.01)
Coordination -.03 (.13) .10 (.14) .09 (.14) -.06 (.14)
U.Coverage -.36 (.37) .28 (.37) .05 (.38) .04 (.31)
ALMP .08 (.35) -.05 (.02) -.00 (.02) -.03 (.02)
Start-up costs .53 (.28)
Minimum Wage .43 (1.8)
Product Market Regulation -1.5 (.54)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 83 137 55 137
Observations 110 110 80 110
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 19: Manufacturing Regression: with aggregate TFP growth
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